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A NO-FAULT REMEDY FOR LEGAL
MALPRACTICE?

*

Melissa Mortazavi

I.

INTRODUCTION

The last forty years have seen a marked rise in legal malpractice
lawsuits.' Recent numbers show that no abatement is in sight; instead the
number of large legal malpractice claims is steadily increasing.2 Some
have estimated that as many as one in five attorneys is sued for legal
malpractice over the course of their careers.' Malpractice insurance
providers note "elevated defense costs" as an element in these large
judgments.' Although lawyers have a personal interest in limiting
liability, they also have a professional one in protecting clients
from harm arising due to malpractice. But how can the legal profession
curtail and manage malpractice liability while also providing relief to
injured clients?'
Here, no-fault systems could provide an alternative to traditional
civil suits to compensate clients for harm. But is it possible to create a
no-fault system where injured clients would trade causes of action
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Oklahoma College of Law. My particular
thanks go to Susan Saab Fortney for her constructive and thoughtful feedback, Burton King for
excellent research assistance, and Roger Michalski.
1. See Manuel R. Ramos, Legal Malpractice: The Profession'sDirty Little Secret, 47 VAND.
L. REV. 1657, 1681 (1994) (examining reasons why, since 1970, there has been an unprecedented
growth in legal malpractice claims and lawsuits); Law Firms Facing Rise in Large Malpractice
Claims: Study, INS. J. (June 13, 2012), http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/
2012/06/13/251170.htm (noting that, in 2011, more than half of the insurers polled had reported
increases in legal malpractice claims of six to ten percent).
2. STEPHEN GILLERS, REGULATION OF LAWYERS: PROBLEMS OF LAW AND ETHics 687 (9th
ed. 2012) (noting an "uptick in successful malpractice claims" when analyzing recent ABA
malpractice data).
3. Ramos, supranote 1, at 1661 n.22, 1666 tbl.1; see id. at 1664-66, 1728, 1731.
4. Law Firms FacingRise in Large MalpracticeClaims: Study, supra note 1.
5. These questions leave aside, for the moment, the normative question of whether fewer
malpractice suits are good or bad for the legal profession and law in general. I save this exploration
for a fuller treatment elsewhere. Instead, this Article assumes the goal of decreasing malpractice
suits while increasing client compensation.
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in tort for predictable, expedient (albeit partial) compensation?6 What
would injury look like? What would partial compensation entail?
Despite these important questions, the advantages of a no-fault system
for sued lawyers are clear: predictability and the ability to plan ahead by
setting aside funds for payouts. The chief benefits for the client are
expediency, predictability, and a guarantee of compensation once harms
are established.
Applying existing tort scholarship on no-fault alternative systems to
professional legal services, this Article argues that no-fault may be a
viable option in many common malpractice circumstances, particularly
those involving true mistake and inevitability. Part II lays out a brief
definition and history of no-fault systems as alternatives to traditional
torts. Part III outlines how a no-fault system could work in the context of
legal malpractice claims. 7 In particular, I examine the infrastructure
already in existence in current state bar systems of "lawyers' funds for
client protection" as a possible nesting ground for a more expansive and
innovative alternative to traditional malpractice suits. Part IV concludes
that while expanded no-fault coverage is a feasible alternative to current
practices, increased fact-finding is needed to support the political will
for reform.
II.

No-FAULT ALTERNATIVES TO TORT

This Part provides a brief overview of dominant examples of nofault regimes used as alternatives to tort recovery in the American legal
market. This Part seeks to establish a familiarity with these systems and
the conceptual lexicon associated with their implementation.
A.

What Is No-Fault?

A no-fault system is one that removes the disposition of claims
regarding harm away from the typical tort analysis of whether or not a
given action was reasonable.' Instead of engaging in fact-intensive
6. Increasingly, jurisdictions are recognizing limited rights of third parties to sue lawyers
other than their own-those they did not have an attorney-client relationship with. Though these
suits remain relatively limited, they would not be avoided by the no-fault system proposed here.
7. The current system requiring proof of fault results in disproportionate and inconsistent
outcomes. See Jeffrey O'Connell, A

"Neo No-Fault" Contract in Lieu of Tort: Preaccident

Guarantees of Postaccident Settlement Offers, 73 CAL. L. REv. 898, 899 (1985) ("The
difficulty of proving fault leads to huge transaction costs.... The result is that many
victims are left either totally or relatively unpaid for their losses, while others in similar or
circumstances are awarded far more than their actual losses.").
8. See JOHN C.P. GOLDBERG ET AL., TORT LAW: RESPONSIBILITIES AND REDRESS
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adjudication of whether or not there was a breach of duty in a given
situation, a no-fault regime simplifies the inquiry into a question of harm
and the status of the parties involved.' Once a qualifying harm to a
covered party is established, the injury is compensated at a set rate,
regardless of fault."o The paying party cannot escape liability by proving
reasonable action or unreasonable action on the part of the aggrieved."
On the other hand, the recovering party cannot argue that they are
entitled to additional compensation.' 2 However, a crucial caveat to the
scope of no-fault is that such claims typically do not negate the ability of
the injured party to bring a concurrent suit for intentional harms.'I
American no-fault alternatives to tort liability share common
elements. No-fault systems typically have three components: a
"triggering event" (thus far, a physical injury); a "payment mechanism"
for compensating the plaintiff; and a "measure of compensation" to
award payment.' 4 Participation in the no-fault system is generally not
mandatory and negates the ability to bring the same claim under a theory
of negligence in tort, thereby alleviating (in theory) judicial-efficiency
concerns about clogging the docket with claims (even meritorious ones)
related to routine and unavoidable harms. Essentially, aggrieved parties
waive the right to sue for garden-variety negligence claims in order to
participate in the alternative compensation system. Perhaps intuitively,

(3d ed. 2012). At one time, several prominent scholars argued that the abolition of the tort system
was an ideal policy choice for accidental harms and proposed no-fault-based alternatives that would
not engage in reasonableness inquiries. See, e.g., Marc A. Franidin, Replacing the Negligence
Lottery: Compensation and Selective Reimbursement, 53 VA. L. REv. 774, 794-802 (1967)

(advocating for the creation of a blanket tort alternative to be largely funded by taxes and which
would provide selective reimbursement for accidental harm); Stephen D. Sugarman, Doing Away
with Tort Law, 73 CAL. L. REv. 555, 603-08 (1985).
9.

See Gary T. Schwartz, Auto No-Fault and First-Party Insurance: Advantages and

Problems, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 611, 616 (2000); Sugarman, supranote 8, at 622-23.
10. See Schwartz, supra note 9, at 616-17, 616 n.18 (comparing a "pure" no-fault system of
unlimited recovery for economic losses with the "hybrid" cap-on-recovery system that is commonly
applied in the context of auto accidents); Sugarman, supra note 8, at 622-23; Peter Nash Swisher,
Virginia Should Abolish the Archaic Tort Defense of Contributory Negligence and Adopt a

ComparativeNegligence Defense in Its Place, 46 U. RICH. L. REv. 359, 363 (2011).
11. See Schwartz, supra note 9, at 616; Swisher, supra note 10, at 363. This concern was
particularly salient in the time of contributory negligence regimes when any plaintiff fault would
negate recovery in its entirety. See Swisher, supra note 10, at 361-64.
12. See Schwartz, supra note 9, at 616 ("[R]ecovery is limited to economic losses; the
victim's noneconomic pain and suffering is ignored.").
13. See O'Connell, supra note 7, at 905 (discussing a proposal for a no-fault system in the
personal injury context).
14.

Kenneth S. Abraham, Alternatives to the Tort System for the Nonmedical Professions:

Can They Do the Job?, 1981 BYU L. REV. 57, 58-59 (breaking down the component parts of
mandatory no-fault systems to this triumvirate).
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no-fault does not engage in an inquiry into fault: defendant fault or
plaintiff fault are not necessary to ascertain. Rather, all that needs to be
established is the qualifying "triggering event." Through a set payment
method and rate of compensation for types of injuries, no-fault promises
prompt, predictable, and guaranteed recovery."s However, in exchange
for expediency and clarity, potential plaintiffs sacrifice the ability to
fully recover because no-fault systems offer only partial recovery.16
Punitive damages are unavailable, and pain and suffering is usually not
compensable. 7 For example, in the case of workers' compensation,
recovery is usually limited to one-half to two-thirds of the employee's
average weekly wage in lieu of compensation for full economic harm."
B.

Examples of No-Fault

The quintessential and most historically entrenched model of a nofault alternative to the tort system is workers' compensation. Workers'
compensation was conceived at the turn of the century in conjunction
with growing public acknowledgment that the industrial revolution had
left entire classes of employees vulnerable to workplace injury and
virtually uncompensated for such physical harms." Workers'
compensation legislation attempted to address these issues while
simultaneously providing incentives to employers to support reform.20 in
exchange for waiving the right to sue for negligence, employees injured
on the job are provided with a set amount of compensation based on the
injury sustained. 2 1 No-fault advocates argue that this system also
15. See supra notes 8-12 and accompanying text. Some would argue this is an empty promise
as alternative systems may become more and more adversarial in nature as time passes, and
traditional adversarial proceedings may adopt elements of alternative systems. John Fabian Witt,
BureaucraticLegalism, American Style: Private BureaucraticLegalism and the Governance of the

Tort System, 56 DEPAUL L. REv. 261, 268-69 (2007) (discussing the author's convergence theory).
16. See, e.g., Franklin, supra note 8, at 799 (proposing that parties would recover, at
maximum, eighty-five percent of lost wages).
17. Key auto accident no-fault plans limited recovery by not allowing pain and suffering
claims and placing monetary caps on medical expenses. See Nora Freeman Engstrom, An
Alternative Explanationfor No-Fault's "Demise", 61 DEPAUL L. REv. 303, 320 (2012); Franklin,
supra note 8, at 799 (mentioning that the author's proposed no-fault system would exclude
compensation for pain and suffering); Noel T. Dowling, Compensationfor Automobile Accidents: A
Symposium, 32 COLUM. L. REV. 785, 798-800 (1932) (discussing what came to be known as the
"Columbia Plan").
18.

VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ ET AL., PROSSER, WADE AND SCHWARTZ'S TORTS 1232 (2010).

19. See Employers' Liability Act, Pub. L. 100, 35 Stat. 65 (1908) (codified as amended at 45
U.S.C. § 51 (2012)).
20. Jeffrey O'Connell, Neo-No-Fault Remedies for Medical Injuries: CoordinatedStatutory
and ContractualAlternatives, 49 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 125, 128 (1986).

21.

Jeffrey O'Connell, Alternatives to the Tort System for PersonalInjury, 23 SAN DIEGO L.
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minimizes externalities and maximizes the amount of money reaching
injured parties as opposed to lawyers representing the injured.22
Over time, however, that assumption has been called into question as
workers' compensation boards and other inquirers examining what
exactly falls within the scope of covered injuries have taken on their own
adversarial qualities. 23
In modernity, no-fault has remained a viable and creative solution
to situations that raise a large number of routine tort claims. The
consumer protection movements of the 1970s drove a renaissance of
support for no-fault alternatives to tort in the auto accident context, as
injuries from auto accidents reached disturbing highs.24 At its apex,
sixteen states had enacted laws restricting the right of motorists to sue.
More recently, victims' compensation funds have applied no-fault
principles to the mass tort context through programs such as the National
Vaccine Injury Compensation Program,26 the September 11th Victim
Compensation Fund,2 7 and the Gulf Coast Compensation Fund.2 1
III.

THE NUTS AND BOLTS: THE DIFFICULTIES OF THE PARTICULAR
CASE OF LEGAL MALPRACTICE

This Part explores the complicated nature of how a no-fault system
could apply in relation to professional legal services. Recall from Part II
the triumvirate of identifiable elements present in other no-fault
REV. 17, 21-23 (1986).
22. See id (highlighting the high transaction costs associated with tort litigation).
23. See Nemchick v. Thatcher Glass Mfg. Co., 495 A.2d 1372, 1372-75 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1985) (finding an employee's injury sustained while driving home from an off-premises task
was covered by workers' compensation); Engstrom, supra note 17, at 313 ("No-fault has become
increasingly lawyer driven and adversarial.").
24. See Engstrom, supra note 17, at 306; infra notes 90-91 and accompanying text.
25. See Engstrom, supra note 17, at 306. Since then, a third of those jurisdictions have
repealed the no-fault legislation. DAVID S. LOUGHRAN, RAND INST. FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, THE
EFFECT OF NO-FAULT AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE ON DRIVER BEHAVIOR AND AUTOMOBILE
ACCIDENTS IN THE UNITED STATES 7 (2001).

26. National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, Pub. L. 99-660, 100 Stat. 3756, 3758
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
27. James Zadroga 9/11 Health and Compensation Act of 2010, Pub. L. 111-347, 124 Stat.
3623, 3660 (2011) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 40101 note (2012)); About the Fund, SEPTEMBER 1lTH
VICTIM COMPENSATION FUND, http://www.vcf gov/genProgramlnfo.html (last visited Feb. 15,
2016).
28. Jackie Calmes & Helene Cooper, BP to Set Aside $20 Billion to Help Oil Spill Victims,
N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 2010, at Al (detailing how the Gulf Coast Compensation fund will be
administered to provide expedient aid to injured parties); Nicholas Guidi, Note, Oil, Fire, Smoke
and Mirrors: The Gulf Coast Claims Facility and Its Dangerous Precedent, WM. & MARY ENVTL.
L. & POL'Y REv. 739, 745-46 (2015) (criticizing the administration and structure of the Gulf Coast
Compensation Fund).
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models: a triggering event, a payment mechanism, and a measure of
compensation.2 9 Each of these elements can be problematic in the legal
setting, but not impracticable. This Part goes through each element to
tease out how harms arising from legal malpractice would fit. It
concludes that while no-fault would not be ideal for all legal malpractice
claims, a sizeable swath of current claims could fall within successful
parameters and, thereby, avoid some of the pitfalls of civil litigation.
A.

What Is the Trigger? DefiningHarm

How does one recognize and define the triggering no-fault event in
the legal services context? What is the harm one would be willing to
recognize as qualifying for compensation? Existing no-fault regimes all
seek to compensate clients for clear physical harm. One can recognize in
many instances whether a physical injury exists and arises out of
operating a vehicle or occurs in a workplace during the course of work. 0
But how does one apply no-fault principles to a system of accidents in
legal practice? The parallel formulation to current no-fault systems
would require the overly vague standard of compensating economic
losses "arising out of professional services." Surely a client is not
entitled to redress every time they lose a claim or suffer any economic
harm arising from representation in a case; so, how do we identify
qualifying economic harms?
An initial factor that aids in the harm inquiry, and in the formation
of an alternative compensation system generally, is narrowing the type
of parties eligible for compensation. Because of a lack of a finite and
static potential recipient pool, critics of auto accident no-fault tort
systems argued that auto accident claims were too dissimilar to workers'
compensation claims to be a viable basis for no-fault (particularly as
related to the regularity of contact between the parties and their place in
a relative hierarchy).3 1 In this context, attorney malpractice is a better
no-fault candidate, as it is a stronger parallel to workers' compensation.
The narrowing of potential claimants is intuitive in the legal services
context. The relationship between a client and an attorney is ongoing in
nature, not haphazard, and premised on a hierarchy where the client
29. Abraham, supra note 14, at 58-59.
30. See UNIF. MOTOR VEHICLES REPARATIONS ACT § 2, 14 U.L.A. 53 (1972) (defining
"injury" as "arising out of maintenance or use of a motor vehicle"); supra notes 23-24 and
accompanying text.
31. See Compensation for Automobile Accidents, supra note 17, at 804-07; Donald W.
Kramer, Fallaciesof a Compensation Planfor Automobile Accident Litigation, 26 INS. COUNS. J.
420,423 (1959).
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relies on the specialized knowledge of the lawyer.3 2 Workers'
compensation is available to employees from their employers. Likewise,
legal malpractice-based no-fault would be available to clients through
their attorneys.
But even if the attorney-client relationship has the advantage of
presenting a relatively clear scope of potential claimants, this does not
make clear which economic harms are compensable. In rendering
professional services, a certain degree of client dissatisfaction is
inevitable, and clients may view the failure to obtain their optimal
outcome as a loss. However, every loss of a legal claim cannot be a
compensable harm. When is it fair for attorneys, not clients, to be
responsible for these harms?33
One way to engage concretely with this question is to specify which
unsatisfactory results are avoidable through reasonable care and which
ones are not.34 This sorting can be used as guidance to generate a list of
compensable events and circumstances. Once this list is generated, the
inquiry would not be whether or not a party was at fault, but simply
whether or not the qualifying event in fact occurred.
What types of infractions could potentially be covered? The most
useful guiding principle in composing such a list is whether or not, as a
matter of good faith, such instances are actually avoidable through due
care. Prominent tort scholars have long argued that accidents cannot be
deterred because they are, by their very nature, unavoidable.3 5 Certain
common legal malpractice issues are identifiable, relatively cut and dry,
and can happen inadvertently despite best efforts to avoid them. They
are common and true accidents in modern legal practice-things that do
not happen consciously or with intention, but which can, and do,
routinely happen inadvertently despite best efforts to the contrary. Nofault acknowledges that such events will occur at times even if all
reasonable care is taken.
Consider the following scenarios that may meet these criteria.

32. Some would argue this is one of the hallmark qualities of being a professional versus a
straightforward businessperson. Eliot Freidson, Theory and the Professions, 64 IND. L.J. 423, 429
(1989). That said, lawyers remain reliant on clients for fees.
33. See Abraham, supra note 14, at 63.
34. Some have suggested an attorney's reasonable decision to call or not call a witness to
testify (who in hindsight would have had a positive impact on the outcome of a case) would be a
potential example of such a qualifying professional action. See id at 62.
35. See Sugarman, supra note 8, at 587 ("[E]xisting regulatory, economic, moral, and selfpreservation pressures fail to control all dangerous conduct that society would like to
deter.. . . Based on a review of the literature, I conclude that theorists who defend torts on
deterrence grounds have no convincing empirical support for their position.").
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1. Inadvertent Disclosure of Confidential Information
Recent studies by the ABA indicate that inadvertent disclosure is
one of the top sources of alleged malpractice error.3 6 However, one
could argue that this is simply a function of modem practice. The
electronic age has led not only to the proliferation of documents
generated, but has also dramatically increased the ease with which they
may be transmitted, viewed, and duplicated."
Furthermore, clients increasingly have the expectation of twentyfour-hour availability and connectivity. However, this availability comes
at the price of security. Even if all reasonable measures are taken to
review client communications privately, the mobile nature of modem
practice on various portable devices that are digitally connected leads to
the inevitable inadvertent disclosure of confidential information sooner
or later. Rather than engage in a fault inquiry (such as whether the client
who texted their attorney demanding an immediate answer is at fault, or
whether the lawyer who responded on the airplane where another
passenger read the message and the lawyer's reply bears fault), no-fault
would simply require that where the disclosure caused an economic
harm, and an injury can be shown arising from the inadvertent release of
confidential information, compensation at a set rate would be due."
2. Certain Conflicts of Interest
Conflicts of interest continue to be one of the most frequently
alleged malpractice claims." Where the number of attorneys in a given
firm may be very large and dispersed geographically and across many
practice areas, the presence of inadvertent conflicts is increasingly
likely. Moreover, complex relationships between clients and the full
36. Dan Pinnington, The Most Common Legal Malpractice Claims by Type ofAlleged Error,
LAW PRAC. (July/Aug. 2010), http://www.americanbar.org/publications/lawjpractice-home/law_
practice archive/lpmmagazine-webonlywebonly07101.html (listing inadvertent disclosure as the
third most common source of malpractice claims).
37. Some would view this as an issue of inadequate discovery, particularly where one was
unable to show a breach of the standard of care.
38. For a discussion on how to create a set rate of compensation based potentially on set
percentages of overall claims, see Part III.C below. Linking claimed harms to potential no-fault
liability would have the collateral positive impact of providing a countervailing force to pressures to
make exaggerated or frivolous claims.
39. Ames & Gough, News Release: Most Leading Law Firms Insurers See Rise in
Malpractice Claims Frequency, Severity (June 18, 2013), http://www.amesgough.com (follow
"New & Events" hyperlink) (ranking conflict of interest violations as the first or second most
common error leading to malpractice judgments by five of seven major insurers).
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extent of corporate entities with overlapping and transient personnel
spread over many industries may not be readily apparent to lawyers or
disclosed by the client. It is not obvious who is at fault for such
conflicts. Rules governing conflicts among current and former clients are
more lenient, allowing waiver as a general matter.40 While conflicts
between current clients may be cured by waiver under certain
circumstances, 4 1 other current client conflicts cannot be so cured and
require that a lawyer remove herself from representing one of the clients,
or possibly both.4 2 Since there is no alternative work-around for these
conflicts, the presence of such conflicts may constitute a situation where
triggering the no-fault system would be merited. While one could argue
that a malpractice suit would ultimately fail in situations where clear
breaches of the duty of care are not established, the fact-intensive
inquiry needed to discern fault in these accident situations does not
preclude the loss of resources to lengthy discovery and trials. If
anything, these are precisely the situations where lengthy trials may
ensue-to establish negligence on the part of the lawyer-defendant on
the one hand, and to establish comparative negligence on the part of the
client-plaintiff, on the other hand.
3. Failure to Timely File or Respond to Written Discovery
Another common form of attorney misconduct is failure to
timely file or respond to written discovery.43 The failure to timely
file a claim or respond to written discovery is an error, not a poor
strategic choice. As lawyers juggle increasing caseloads and rely on
novel electronic systems to file and remind them of calendaring
requirements, a certain number of cases or motions may inevitably be
subject to default on the basis of such error, subjecting the lawyer
responsible for the error to liability.
4. Failure to Know the Law
The failure to know the law is another frequent source of
malpractice insurance claims." One could argue that given the common
40.

MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.8(b) (AM. BAR ASS'N 2013).

41. Id. r. 1.7(b)(4).
42. Id. r. 1.7(a), (b)(2)-(3) (disallowing waiver by clients where the conflict is prohibited by
law or where it arises from clients being directly adverse in a given litigation).
43.

See Edward R. Blumberg, Ten Scenarios That Provoke Motionsfor Sanctions-And How

to Avoid Them, 28 ABA LAW. MAN. PROF. CONDUCT 613 (noting that failure to respond to timesensitive discovery is a breach of Rule 1.3 of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct
("Model Rules") and one of the most common attorney errors).
44. Pinnington, supra note 36; Barbara Power, Good Client Communications Can Help
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law system, increasingly-complicated intersections between statutory
and regulatory law, and heavy caseloads, some failure to know the law
errors may be inevitable. The law changes rapidly, and, while diligence
requires a lawyer to do research and be prepared, one can also imagine a
no-fault system covering economic harms arising out of changes in the
law that have occurred in a pre-set small time horizon, such as the
previous ten days or less.
5. Failure to Communicate with a Client
Wrongs arising from failures in client communication continue to
make up a sizeable portion of malpractice claims.45 These claims include
failure to obtain client consent or follow client instruction.4 6 While
sufficient communication with a client is not a perfect art, and the terms
governing client communication are somewhat open ended,47 certain
communications regarding decision making are more clear-cut and
might provide a good basis for a no-fault presumptive harm. For
example, rules of professional responsibility make clear that clients have
full autonomy concerning the objectives of a representation; meaning, it
is the client's decision, not the lawyer's, whether to accept a plea, waive
a jury trial, or testify in the criminal context or settle in the civil one.48
Error in this area may also be somewhat inevitable-communication is
not always an exact science particularly in the digital age when,
increasingly, communication can take the form not only of traditional
writings or spoken word but also email or even text messages.4 9
Lawyers Avoid Malpractice Claims, L. PRAC. TODAY (Aug. 2009), http://apps.americanbar.org/
1pm/lpt/articles/mgt08091.shtml (estimating ten percent of legal malpractice claims arise from not
knowing the law).
45. Dan Pinnington, Avoiding Malpractice-Are You at Risk?, LAW PRAC. (July/Aug. 2010),
http://www.americanbar.org/publications/lawpracticehome/law-practice archive/lpm magazine_
webonlywebonly07101.html (summarizing ABA studies of malpractice claims from 2004-2007
and listing failure to obtain client consent as 5.4% of total malpractice claims and failure to follow
instructions as 4.4% of total malpractice claims). This is a conservative estimate. Some would argue
that an even larger swath of malpractice claims can be categorized as a lack of proper
communication. See Power, supra note 44 (stating that the "overwhelming majority" of the ninety
percent of claims not arising out of failure to know the law are really about poor communication).
46. Pinnington, supra note 45.
47.

MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.4 (Am. BAR Ass'N 2013) (using terms like

"prompt" and "reasonable," both terms that are easily subject to interpretation and debate).
48. Id. r. 1.2(a).
49.

Carolyn Elefant, Maybe the Time Has Come for Lawyers to Have a Conversation

About Texting or SnapChatting With Clients, MYSHINGLE (Sept. 8, 2015), http://myshingle.com/
2015/09/articles/client-relations/maybe-the-time-has-come-for-lawyers-to-have-a-conversationabout-texting-or-snapchatting-with-clients (reporting on states, including Florida and Wisconsin
specifically adopting ethics rules regarding texting); Wendy L. Patrick, Why Talk When You Can
Text?, CA. B.J. (Oct. 2010), http://apps.calbar.ca.gov/mcleselfstudy/mcle home.aspx?testlD-42
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6. Death of an Attorney During the Course of Litigation or
Negotiation
Given that death and taxation are the only certainties applicable to
everyone, lawyers sometimes will die during the course of a
representation. This is not a result of carelessness. One can hardly
imagine a situation where the incongruity between liability and
deterrence in the tort context could be more apparent than in the case of
a lawyer's death. Lawyers are not deterred from avoiding their own
demise due to civil liability. Death is a truly unavoidable accident that
may inevitably happen in the course of professional practice.so
Tort law is often referred to as "the law of accidents.""' Indeed,
each of these triggering situations can occur as the result of accidents.
However, that does not mean that they are not the subject of malpractice
suits. On the contrary, we know that these are common topics of
malpractice litigation. One could argue, however, that these situations,
where the harm occurs regardless of whether reasonable care was taken,
would not give rise to malpractice liability. Malpractice liability requires
a breach-a lapse in the use of a reasonable standard of care. As such,
would no-fault based on these types of scenarios really lessen potential
malpractice suits? The answer is yes, it would. No-fault need not provide
an alternative to only potentially successful malpractice claims. The
purpose is to avoid their adjudication and increase the breadth of
potential recovery on the part of harmed parties. Like other no-fault
systems such as workers' compensation and auto accident no-fault, legal
service no-fault would also sweep into its ambit conduct that would not
have met the standards of malpractice liability. In this way, no-fault is,
by definition, over-inclusive. This is its trade: in exchange for not having
to engage in the often nuanced and difficult inquiry into fault, on both
the plaintiffs and defendant's sides of the conflict, no-fault sweeps both
blameworthy and non-blameworthy conduct into its ambit.
B. Payment Mechanism: The Potentialof Client ProtectionFunds
A strong no-fault system would be mandatory and carry with it the
force of law, having been passed through the legislative process.
However, even if such a form of no-fault is not available, the bar
(discussing trends and pitfalls of lawyers using email and text to communicate with clients).
50. In the event of suicide, the bar would need to consider whether or not the intentional
nature of the act would disqualify it from coverage.
51. See, e.g., John Fabian Witt, Toward a New History ofAmerican Accident Law: Classical
Tort Law and the Cooperative First-PartyInsurance Movement, 114 HARv. L. REv. 690, 694
(2001).
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may be able to use no-fault principles to guide the use of existing
compensation structures in a way that is mutually beneficial for lawyers
and their clients.
How to compensate clients for harms resulting from legal
malpractice is not a new issue. It was keenly discussed in the 1970s and
1980s when there was a strong push to require mandatory malpractice
insurance as a condition of bar membership.52 One format this discussion
took was the consideration of generalized "professional liability funds."
A form of self-insurance, these funds would have compelled every
member of the bar to contribute to a fund that would be available to
clients in instances of attorney malpractice.s" Ultimately discussions of
mandatory malpractice insurance and professional liability funds fizzled
out. Today, Oregon is the only state that requires mandatory malpractice
insurance for practicing attorneys. 54 Initiated pursuant to statute and
membership approval in 1978, Oregon has since had a professional
liability fund that provides mandatory malpractice primary coverage for
Oregon lawyers.55

However, one remnant of these initiatives remains: most states in
the United States have client protection funds ("CPFs"). 6 CPFs are
funds usually administered by the bar of a given state to compensate
certain classes of injured clients for particular enumerated claims.
Substantively, CPFs cover intentional torts arising from "dishonest
conduct," particularly misappropriation.1 7 CPFs list as key claims the
mishandling of funds and property, improper borrowing or retention of
client funds, and conversion. Essentially, where a lawyer steals or retains
advanced fees unjustly,ss the bar in most states steps in and makes sure
52.

See Nicole A. Cunitz, Mandatory Malpractice Insurance for Lawyers: Is There a

Possibility of Public Protection Without Compulsion?, 8 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHics 637, 644, 651
(1995).
53. Oregon actually ratified such a fund in the late 1970s. OR. REV. STAT. §§ 9.080(2)(a),
9.191(3) (2013). California considered a similar plan, but ultimately rejected it. Benjamin Franklin
Boyer & Gary Conner, Legal Malpractice and Compulsory Client Protection, 29 HASTINGS L.J.

835, 836 (1978).
54. Herbert M. Kritzer & Neil Vidmar, When the Lawyer Screws Up: A Portrait of Legal
Malpractice Claims and Their Resolution 3 (July 7, 2015) (working paper),
http://scholarship.law.duke.edulfaculty scholarship/3491.
55. Professional Liability Fund, OR. STATE BAR, https://www.osbar.org/plf/plf.html (last
visited Feb. 15, 2016).
56.

See For the Record: NCPO Speaks to Professionalism,CLIENT PROTECTION WEBB (Nat'l

Client Prot. Org., Inc., Loudonville, N.Y.), Summer 2001, at 1.
57. See, e.g., Carol G. Green, Profile: Client Protectionin Kansas, KAN. JuDIcLARY BRANCH
(last visited Feb. 15, 2016), http://www.kscourts.org/appellate-clerk/general/lawyers-fund-forclient-protection/profile.asp.
58.

See, e.g., COLO. R. Civ. P. 252.10(c)(1)-(2); RULES OF THE CALIFORNIA STATE BAR
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the aggrieved party receives some sort of recompense. CPFs are
available to clients only (not their heirs, dependents, or assigns) for
infractions by practicing and admitted members of the bar.59
As they stand today, CPFs cover claims involving particularly clear
intentional fault (such as in cases of embezzlement) rather than no-fault
claims. 0 As such, the CPF structure fails to provide a key benefit of nofault systems-removing costly and lengthy adjudications from the civil
system. Commonly, CPFs also require that the claimant exhaust civil
remedies or obtains formal disciplinary action against the attorney prior
to filing a claim.6" In jurisdictions with such a requirement, claimants
must have brought a civil action prior to availing themselves of the
opportunity to potentially receive CPF funds. Finally, many states
require claimants to sign subrogation agreements, entitling the bar to
pursue indemnity from the offending lawyer or firm.62 Therefore, the
CPF structure implies at least the potential of increased civil litigation in
the future for indemnity claims.6 3
Still, the presence of CPFs do show a willingness on the part of bar
associations across the country to collectively provide compensation to
clients for qualifying events. Building on this base understanding, one

r. 3.431 (STATE BAR OF CAL. 2007).
59. See, e.g., RULES OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAII r. 10.1(a) (HAW.
SUPREME COURT 1981); CLIENTS' FIN. ASSISTANCE FUND OF THE INDIANA STATE BAR ASS'N
RULES OF PROCEDURE r. 2(a)(i) (IND. STATE BAR ASS'N 2008).
60. See, e.g., Client Protection Fund Frequently Asked Questions About the Fund, ST. B.

ARIZ.
(last
visited
Feb.
15,
clientprotectionfund# notreimbursable.
61.

2016),

http://www.azbar.org/legalhelpandeducation/

See, e.g., GEORGIA STATE BAR PROGRAMS r. 10-106(c), (h) (STATE BAR OF GA. 2015)

(requiring a formal disciplinary action in order to obtain client protection fund payments);
PENNSYLVANIA RULES OF DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT r. 521(f)(2) (PA. SUPREME COURT 2015)

(authorizing fund administrators to require a claimant to file a complaint against an attorney with
the disciplinary board as a condition of payment); VERMONT BAR Ass'N CLIENT'S SEC. FUND
RULES r. 8(c)(1) (VT. BAR ASS'N 2003) (disallowing payment from the fund unless disciplinary
proceedings have been commenced and the attorney has been suspended or disbarred, or has
resigned).
62.

See, e.g., SOUTH CAROLINA LAWYERS' FUND FOR CLIENT PROT. RULES OF P.

§ IV (S.C.

BAR ASS'N 2015) (requiring subrogation by the client in the event of reimbursement for a claim);
TENNESSEE SUPREME COURT RULES r. 25,

§ 9.02(o)

(TENN. SUPREME COURT 2005) (requiring an

initial claim form to include a subrogation agreement and an assignment of any claims against the
offending lawyer); VERMONT BAR Ass'N CLIENT'S SEC. FUND RULES r. 15(A) (requiring a client to
execute a subrogation agreement prior to payment if the fund administration approves a claim).
63.

See, e.g., SOUTH CAROLINA LAWYERS' FUND FOR CLIENT PROT. RULES OF P.

§ IV

("Upon commencement of an action by the South Carolina Bar pursuant to its subrogation rights, it
shall advise the reimbursed client at his last known address. A reimbursed client may then join in
such action to press an application for his loss in excess of the amount of the above
reimbursement.").
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could use CPFs as the payment mechanism for a no-fault system.64
Current coverage should not focus exclusively on "hyper-fault"
situations involving intentional torts, but could be reformulated to a nofault injury based inquiry. Instead of asking if the lawyer engaged in
dishonest conduct, a no-fault system could simplify the inquiry: were
there economic damages arising out of one of the qualifying scenarios?
These scenarios could include misappropriation of client funds,
intentional or not. If such misappropriation occurs, the system is
triggered. While establishing the necessary causal links would still be
fact-intensive and potentially require expert testimony, it would avoid
time-consuming and costly breach inquiries.
Alternatively, CPFs could be augmented to include two types of
harms. The first would be to continue to provide coverage for intentional
misappropriation; the second would be to offer redress for true
no-fault situations that cannot be deterred effectively through civil
liability-accidents. Again, this would require drafting of a list of
qualifying events. However, once drafted, these claims could be
administered expediently.
A key challenge would be finding the money to fully fund such
efforts. One option is to raise the money from the bar, which is sure to
be unpopular. Another option is to increase court fees and seek
legislative appropriation on the state level. Yet another possibility would
be to re-appropriate Interest on Lawyer Trust Accounts ("IOLTA")
funds for this purpose. However, when interest rates are low, such funds
are typically already depleted. Moreover, re-purposing such funds would
face resistance from legal services organizations that currently depend
on IOLTA funds.
C.

Measure of Compensation:How to Evaluate Claims

The final element in a plausible no-fault proposal is to consider
how to evaluate the economic value of claims. How to determine
damages in this context is an interesting puzzle. Certain types of
practices, like residential real estate and bankruptcy, usually give rise to
smaller malpractice claims. However, they arise with greater
frequency.6 1 In other areas, like corporate and securities law, legal
64. That said, current funding of these systems is low at best. It is not that current funds could
be stretched to cover no-fault, but that the basic infrastructure of CPFs could provide a basis for
expansion.
65. Law Firms Facing Rise in Large Malpractice Claims: Study, supra note 1; Martha Neil,
Real Estate Now Tops Legal MalpracticeClaims List, ABA-Published Study Shows, ABA J. (Sept.
6, 2012, 2:00 PM),
http://www.abajournal.com/mobile/article/abaprofessional liability
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malpractice lawsuits are less frequent but the stakes per claim are
higher."6 It is not difficult to imagine a table, with each covered
infraction listed with a corresponding payout amount, similar to that for
physical injury in workers' compensation, where injuries to different
parts of the body are monetized. Given the range of harms available in
different practices, the payout amount should likely be variable, and may
best be standardized by having the damage amount multiplied by a
percentage of the overall damages alleged in the matter. In addition to
other benefits, this approach would provide an added incentive for
lawyers not to overly inflate the damages they seek against opposing
parties and plead reasonably. For example, instead of suing for the
largest amount possible based on rough estimates and research, pleading
lawyers would have a stronger incentive to think carefully about what
damages are truly defensible, especially where that amount could
become the basis of the lawyer's own potential payout.
As an administrative matter, CPFs may provide some guidance as
far as how to deliberately structure compensation to minimize
transaction costs and maximize distribution of funds to the broadest
number of possible applicants. Since removing negative externalities is a
strong selling point for no-fault, it is essential that it actually reduces
aggregate costs. This is accomplished with CPFs in several ways. First,
CPFs do not provide coverage for losses already compensated through
other sources such as civil suits, settlement, or insurance."7 This runs
counter to the traditional common law tort "collateral source rule,"
which disregards any other forms of compensation, particularly from
insurance, when calculating losses." Second, a majority of states have
set limits between two and five years for clients to make their claims for
compensation from a CPF." Finally, CPFs also typically have damage
committee saysstudy shows real estate now tops (discussing how the results of the 2008-2011
survey of over 50,000 insurance providers revealed that real estate transactions were the most
frequent source of malpractice claims).
66. See Law FirmsFacingRise in Large Malpractice Claims: Study, supra note 1.
67. For example, in Alabama, "losses recoverable from some other source" are nonreimbursable. ALABAMA STATE BAR SEC. FUND RULES r. 2E(h) (AL. STATE BAR 2015).
68. DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 1058 (2000) ("The traditional rule is that
compensation from 'collateral sources' is none of the defendant's business and does not go to
reduce the defendant's obligation to pay damages, either in negligence or in strict liability cases.").
The failure to negate the collateral source rule is one factor that has been identified in limiting the
proliferation of auto no-fault. Engstrom, supra note 17, at 337-41.
69. See GEORGIA STATE BAR PROGRAMS r. 10-106(d), (h) (STATE BAR OF GA. 2(15)
(requiring that claims be brought within two years unless extenuating circumstances exist, but under
no circumstance more than seven years after the occurrence of the injuring event); RULES AND
REGULATIONS CONCERNING THE LAWYERS' FUND FOR CLIENT PROT. r. 6.1 (HAW. SUPREME

COURT 2009) (mandating that claims must be brought within two years of the qualifying event). But
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caps that can range from as little as $10,000 to upwards of $300,000.70
Each of these elements potentially lowers costs and allows for broader
coverage of harmed claimants.
D.

Legislative and ContractualProto-Proposals

Ideally, a no-fault amendment to common tort would originate from
a legislative source. Such a statute could be structured to allow a lawyer
accused of malpractice not arising from intentional injury a set period of
time (for example, 180 days) to offer payment of economic losses and
attorney's fees in satisfaction of all tort claims against them. 7 1
Alternatively, a statute could set out types of injuries and set payment
amounts for each type of injury. In determining the payment amounts,
the legislature could consider a formula, which could take into account
factors like the clients' overall claim value, hourly billable rate, or pay
structure of the lawyer-client engagement if based on a flat fee.
How is this different than any other settlement? The statute could
require that plaintiffs must accept such an offer. The guiding idea here
remains that most clients subject to legal malpractice receive otherwise
no compensation, and, therefore, a guarantee of prompt payment is a fair
disposition of their case. Lawyers, like employers before them in the
workers' compensation context, may support the enactment of such
statutes to increase predictability and the concurrent ability to manage
risk without any seeming admission of guilt. Undoubtedly, more careful
lawyers, or lawyers in fields less prone to suit, would be less supportive
of such a no-fault statute as they would perceive their malpractice risk as
low. The next Part will discuss in more detail how a key element in
making this system plausible is the high threat of litigious behavior.7 2
Malpractice risk is growing, and at a certain tipping point, no-fault could
be a more attractive alternative to potential malpractice risk for most
practicing lawyers.
see RULES OF THE CALIFORNIA STATE BAR r. 3.434 (STATE BAR OF CAL. 2007) (capping claims on

qualifying events occurring before January 1, 2009 at $50,000-half of the maximum amount of
compensation for claims after that date).
70. For example, Wyoming and New Mexico set limits at $10,000, while New York sets
limits at $300,000. Standing Comm. on Prof'1 Responsibility, 2008-10 Survey ofLawyers' Funds
for Client Protection, ABA CENT. PROF'L REsP., http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/

administrative/professional responsibility/29th forum_2008_2010_survey of lawyers funds for_
client protection.authcheckdam.pdf (last visited Feb. 15, 2016).
71. This option is substantially modeled after proposed no-fault legislation relating to medical
malpractice. See, e.g., Medical Offer and Recovery Act, H.R. 3084, 99th Cong. § 2 (1985);
O'Connell, supra note 20, at 129.
72. See infra Part IV.
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A comprehensive statutory no-fault system akin to workers'
compensation would require either the political will to mandate it as a
matter of statutory law or at minimum the unified will of the bar to
create an internal no-fault-style system by expanding client protection
funds. This is unlikely though, given longstanding resistance on the part
of the bar to mandatory insurance and disclosure of insurance status. In
the interim, the ability of parties to enter contractually into no-fault-style
arrangements may be a viable alternative. One option is to offer, at the
outset of representation, a schedule of payments that are available to the
client in the event that a qualifying injury occurs. Injured parties could
have a set amount of time (for example, ninety days after the discovery
of an injury) to take advantage of such automatic payouts in exchange
for not bringing a tort suit. 74 Because pain and suffering is difficult to
determine, such payouts would likely follow the dominant existing nofault plans and compensate for economic losses rather than noneconomic pain and suffering.
The attorney-client relationship may be more conducive to
contractual modification of traditional torts rights. Specifically, the
parties involved are finite and clear, as opposed to no-fault in the auto
accident context where the drivers at issue are virtually impossible to
ascertain prior to the accident. In an attorney-client conflict, we also
know who the allegedly injured party is, and who the alleged wrongdoer
is. These types of accidents are far less likely to originate from an
unpredictable or unknown source than a typical personal injury tort.
Such agreements would require endorsement by the bar of many
states, since existing professional norms would need to be modified to
provide a no-fault exception. Current rules of ethics impede such
contractual agreements as they bar limitation of prospective liability
without consultation of outside counsel and set specific parameters for
settlement of malpractice claims.7 5 That said, there is precedent to carry
73. See Susan Saab Fortney, Law as a Profession: Examining the Role of Accountability, 40
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 177, 192-93 (2012) (quoting Leslie Levin, Bad Apples, Bad Lawyers or Bad
Decisionmaking: Lessons from Psychology and from Lawyers in the Dock, 22 GEo. J. LEGAL

ETHICS 1549, 1588 (2009)) (discussing the rejection of a mandatory insurance requirement as well
as lawyers' resistance to mandatory disclosure).
74. See O'Connell, supra note 20, at 131-32. This would parallel the "discovery rule" in terms
of tolling a claim in the statute of limitations context.
75. Specifically, Rule 1.8(h) of the Model Rules states that a lawyer shall not
(1) make an agreement prospectively limiting the lawyer's liability to a client for
malpractice unless the client is independently represented in making the agreement;
or
(2) settle a claim or potential claim for such liability with an unrepresented client or
former client unless that person is advised in writing of the desirability of seeking

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2015

17

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 44, Iss. 2 [2015], Art. 14

488

HOFSTRA IAWREVIEW

[Vol. 44:471

out necessary exceptions to general rules. While lawyers generally may
not have an economic interest in the outcome of a client's case, the bar
specifically allows contingency fee arrangements in order to increase
access to civil counsel.7 6 Here, too, there is a public interest
justification for a no-fault exception-the ability of more injured parties
to be compensated.
IV.

WHAT Do WE WANT? NO-FAULT! WHEN Do
WE WANT IT? Now?

Having established that no-fault has had measured success in other
contexts and how it could work as an alternative to legal malpractice
litigation, I will now turn to the question of how viable it is to implement
such a legal malpractice no-fault compensation regime.
Several prominent tort scholars have argued that successful
implementation of an alternative no-fault scheme rests on a convergence
of factors, particularly the presence of political will to enact a no-fault
system.77 In her article entitled An Alternative Explanation for NoFault's Demise, Professor Nora Freeman Engstrom identifies precursors
present in prominent no-fault movements." Drawing from these
observations, certain common factors emerge. No-fault systems are most
viable when four factors converge: (1) a general ethos of public reform
(for workers' compensation, it was the "Progressive Era," and for auto
accident no-fault, it was known as the "Public Interest Era"); (2) a shift
in how the public views the harm itself (as inevitable rather than as a
function of individual carelessness); (3) the harms themselves need to be
on a notable rise; and (4) there is relatively little insurance, along with a
general dissatisfaction with how private legal actions, and specifically
tort claims, are handling the allocation of funds (the notion that while
some people get a lot, a lot of injured people get nothing).79
and is given a reasonable opportunity to seek the advice of independent legal
counsel in connection therewith.
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.8(h) (AM. BAR Ass'N 2013).
76. Id. r. 1.5(c).
77. See Robert L. Rabin, Some Reflections on the Process of Tort Reform, 25 SAN DIEGO L.
REv. 13, 18 (1988) (arguing that existing systems of discerning harm, compensation, and
adjudication are "likely to be altered only when tort reform rides on the coattails of a more powerful
ideological impulse").
78. See Engstrom, supra note 17, at 310-12. Engstrom focuses her inquiry in this regard on a
discussion of the history of workers' compensation and auto accident no-fault. Id.
79. See id. Robert Keeton and Jeffrey O'Connell stoked discussions regarding auto accident
no-fault compensation by highlighting how relatively few injured parties received any compensation
and how even amongst those that have been compensated, few were fully compensated for
egregious harms. See Robert E. Keeton & Jeffrey O'Connell, Basic Protection-A Proposalfor
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This Part will examine these criteria as applied to legal
malpractice.so Subsequently, this Part will conclude that certain
antecedents are in place, and that the time may be near to pursue no-fault
options as an alternative to legal malpractice. 8 ' However, this
plausibility hinges predominantly on the presence of political will,
interest in reform, and general public concern over areas of
undercompensated client harm that could use substantial development.
A.

An EraofReform?

Legal scholars have linked successful no-fault legislation to eras of
public mobilization, arguing that they correlate closely with a historical
context open to their adoption.82 When discussing previous "eras of
reform" necessary for no-fault development, tort scholars have identified
two key time periods-the "Progressive" and "Public Interest" eras.
The "Progressive Era" at the turn of the century is viewed as the
igniting force behind the development and adoption of workers'
compensation." A combination of industrialization and the realization
that the workplace had fundamentally changed galvanized a new
scrutiny of the ability of traditional tort claims to adequately provide
compensation to injured parties. The world of the workplace had
changed and there was a political willingness to readjust compensation
schemes for that reality.
The second period of reform identified in relation to the growing
popularity of no-fault systems has been dubbed the "Public Interest
Era."84 Spanning from roughly the late 1960s through the 1970s, reform
during this time was focused on individual rights, the environment, and
the protection of consumers. Another characteristic of this time period
was a broad skepticism of government, particularly legal institutions and
Improving Automobile Claims Systems, 78 HARv. L. REV. 329, 349-50 (1964).
80. See infra Part IV.A-C.
81. See infra Part IV.D.
82.

See, e.g., KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, THE LIABILITY CENTURY: INSURANCE AND TORT LAW

FROM THE PROGRESSIVE ERA TO 9/11 97 (2008) (discussing the history of the adoption of the nofault system and linking it to a distinct historical context); VIRGINIA E. NOLAN & EDMUND
URSIN, UNDERSTANDING ENTERPRISE LIABILITY: RETHINKING TORT REFORM FOR THE TWENTY-

FIRST CENTURY 56 (1995) (noting auto accident no-fault's appearance "during the consumer
movement ... [as] the right plan at the right time").
83.

See ABRAHAM, supra note 77, at 97.

84. See Rabin, supra note 72, at 21; Robert L. Rabin, Federal Regulation in Historical
Perspective, 38 STAN. L. REV. 1189, 1278-95 (1986).
85.

See generally MARK V. NADEL, THE POLITICS OF CONSUMER PROTECTION (1971)

(discussing the general consumer protection movements of the late 1960s and early 1970s); Rabin,
supra note 79, at 1278-95.
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the justice system in general. The Public Interest Era is associated
with the proliferation of auto accident no-fault proposals, which in the
mid-1970s were active in every state and by some accounts numbered
into the hundreds."
Is American society currently in a general "era of reform"? Without
the benefit of hindsight, gauging this particular measure is difficult.
However, there is a historical climate indicating a radical change in the
American workplace and lifestyle that allows the drawing of parallels
to industrialization. The workplace reality, and the way Americans
live their lives, have changed markedly in the last ten years with
the advent of widespread connectivity, smart phones, and tablets. The
age of "digital natives," has led to altered ways of communicating,
created modified expectations of availability and responsiveness,
and exposed new tensions relating to privacy and the availability of data
that was once private. 87 A service-driven economy has triumphed over
one that is goods-based. This technological shift from in-person to
online and from manufacturer to operator can be analogized to the
radical shift from the rural model of production to the industrial one at
the turn of the last century.
Not unlike the Public Interest Era, the public's views of
governmental and industry institutions and its confidence in them is
weak. The "Occupy Wall Street" movement, with its amorphous set of
claims, may not have had a clear policy agenda, but it was clearly antiestablishment, highlighted inequity, and possessed broad geographic
appeal. 8 The division of the haves and have-nots in American society
has been further publically exposed in the failures of public entities to
administer relief effectively and equitably in response to natural
disasters. 89 Likewise, recent events involving law enforcement and the
failure of the justice system to adequately reckon with racially-charged
86.

No-Fault Motor Vehicle Insurance: Hearings on H.R. 285, H.R. 1272, HR. 1900, H.R.

7985, and H.R. 8441 Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Prot. and Fin. of the H. Comm. on

Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 94th Cong. 600-01 (1975) (statement of Paul Blume, Vice
President and General Counsel, National Association of Independent Insurers) (stating that the
states had paid "serious consideration" to "well over 600 no-fault measures").
87. See generally Jane Yakowitz Bambauer, The New Intrusion,88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 205
(2012) (discussing how data is related to privacy concerns).
88. Charles M. Blow, Occupy Wall Street Legacy, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 13, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/14/opinion/blow-occupy-wall-street-legacy.html?_r=0 (noting the
slogan "we are the 99 percent" and a Pew Poll indicating that, in 2013, forty percent of Americans
felt that government policies benefit the large corporations and fewer than eight percent reported
feeling that government policies benefit the poor).
89. See Paul Krugman, Sandy Versus Katrina, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 4, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/05/opinion/krugman-sandy-versus-katrina.html.
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incidents have renewed skepticism of institutional legitimacy and
sparked the "Black Lives Matter" campaign.' Environmental concerns
run high as tensions over oil and hydraulic fracturing clash against
growing concerns over global climate change.9 1 Through social media
and other Internet sources, individuals are mobilizing around causes and
pooling funding with a speed and ease that is revolutionary. 92
Thus, the presence of both a shift in how Americans work and live,
(not unlike the Progressive Era), coupled with decreased confidence in
governmental institutions (mirroring the Public Interest Era), indicates
that American society is either in, or on the cusp of, a reform era.
B. Inevitable or Careless?
However, the presence of a reform era alone is not enough to
successfully implement a no-fault regime. Success of no-fault proposals
also requires shifts in public viewpoints regarding the culpability
attaching to specific harms. For tort liability to be set aside, there must
be an understanding that a certain degree of harm is an inevitable
product of a specific enterprise." In the no-fault context that was
relatively easy--even with all reasonable care taken-a certain
percentage of car accidents will arise. In the workers' compensation
arena, one could argue that workplace injury was also inevitable given
the time employees spend at work and the frequency of exposure to

90. See, e.g., Johnson v. Bay Area
(recounting the refusal of a lower court to
officers involved in the shooting of Oscar
Fruitvale, California); Tamara F. Lawson, A

Rapid Transit Dist., 724 F.3d 1159 (9th Cir. 2013)
dispose, on summary judgment, claims against police
Grant, an unarmed black man, on a train platform in
FreshCut in an Old Wound-A CriticalAnalysis of the

Trayvon Martin Killing: The Public Outcry, The Prosecutors' Discretion, and the Stand Your

GroundLaw, 23 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 271, 274-84 (2012) (discussing the divisive impact of
the shooting of Trayvon Martin); Celestine Bohlen, Students See New Hope in Bias Protests, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 16, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/16/education/students-see-new-hope-inbias-protests.html?ref-topics (reporting on the "Black Lives Matter" movement).
91.

See Lynn Cook, In Fracking, the Energy Business Gets Neighborly, WALL STREET

J.

(Mar. 10, 2014), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142405270230402010457943129020503
1238.
92. Although the ability to pool funding and mobilize around common interests is now
widespread, the trend towards the use of the Internet for such purposes was trail-blazed in the late
1990s by organizations like MoveOn.org. Ronald Brownstein, MoveOn Steps into DNC Chair
Contest, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 26, 2005), http://articles.latimes.com/2005/jan/26/nation/na-dnc26 (noting
that MoveOn was started in 1998 in response to President Clinton's impeachment and grew over
time to have broader influence over Democratic Party politics).
93. See, e.g., JOHN FABIAN WITT, THE ACCIDENTAL REPUBLIC: CRIPPLED WORKINGMEN,
DESTITUTE WIDOWS, AND THE REMAKING OF AMERICAN LAW 63-65 (2004) (explaining that

the success of workers' compensation was linked to the idea of "inevitable risks" in contrast to
human fault).
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potential, even quotidian, harms.
But are certain injuries an inevitability of legal practice? Modem
legal practice is fundamentally different and more complicated than
what it was at the turn of the century. The rise of the administrative state
has complicated the law itself and introduced entire areas of law that did
not exist at common law. Technological innovations of recent decades
have created new challenges in lawyering and in relationships with
clients.94 There is, quite simply, much more law to know and sources of
law to monitor for change than ever before. Likewise, there are more
facts to discover, as well as more ways to discover them and more ways
to lose sight of them.
One way to meet this element is to tailor no-fault proposals to cover
only those harms that meet this criterion of "inevitability." Part IV
attempts to list situations that arise in modem practice that I believe are
inevitable and are not fully preventable through reasonable care-true
accidents. As such, I believe that a no-fault plan covering harms arising
from such situations would not only be plausible, but also ideal. These
accidents are not well-suited to fault inquires and therefore can be
lengthy. The question is not whether these cases would eventually
succeed as malpractice claims, but whether these are harms best
compensated through the tort system. Or does it just make sense to
simply view legal malpractice claims as the cost of modem practice?
The examples in this Article illustrate that situations giving rise to
malpractice liability do arise in legal practice. Some may arise
from fault, and some may not; but, regardless of how they arise, when
they do, a harm has occurred and litigation may be a poor system to
rectify that harm.
C. Harms on the Rise
In both the auto accident no-fault and workers' compensation
scenarios, there was clear evidence that harms were widespread and
growing.95 This documentation, particularly when from governmental
sources, lent credibility and urgency to reform movements and made for
a winning combination. 96
94.

See SUSAN SAAB FORTNEY & VINCENT R. JOHNSON, LEGAL MALPRACTICE LAW:

PROBLEMS AND PREVENTION 2-3 (2008) (arguing that modernization of legal practice, including
technological advances that distance clients from lawyers, makes risk of malpractice "a daily reality
for practitioners").
95. See, e.g., JOHN A. VOLPE, DEP'T OF TRANSP., MOTOR VEHICLE CRASH LOSSES AND
THEIR COMPENSATION IN THE UNITED STATES 1-3 (1971); WITT, supranote 88, at 63-65.

96.

See, e.g., VOLPE, supra note 95, at 2 (stating that loss of human life to automobiles was
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In the legal malpractice context, the marked rise of malpractice
actions and the harms they cause should be a forgone conclusion.
Conventional wisdom is that legal malpractice is experiencing a boom as
law firms create internal in-house counsel for professional liability
issues and retain outside counsel to assess and defend them from
malpractice. Reputable sources note that pre-1970s legal malpractice
claims were relatively rare and have risen exponentially since that
time.97 There are limited studies confirming the general wisdom that
there has been a proliferation of malpractice claims, but the mandatory
reporting requirements of jurisdictions like Florida provide some
window into the current state of affairs, as do private studies by the
insurance industry."
However, the numbers are piecemeal. Increased empirical attention
is needed to ascertain not only how many insurance claims are filed, but
also how many lawsuits are filed and how many are dismissed or settled
without filing insurance claims. Most of all, it is unclear whether there
are increased instances of improper professional conduct. The current
measures only show that malpractice claims are on the rise, but what
they do not show is a crisis of more and more clients being harmed. 99
Reporting misconduct to the bar is a poor proxy of client harm, although
that is also on the rise."oo It is entirely possible that clients are being
harmed more frequently since the bar is larger and more dispersed. Law
practices are increasingly hierarchical, leading to less mentorship and
oversight. The law itself is more nebulous and the facts more
voluminous and elusive. Thus, there is circumstantial evidence
indicating that harms to clients are in fact rising, but further study is
needed to know if that is in fact true.
D.

Public View that the Existing CompensationSystem Is Ineffective
No-fault

regimes

have

been

considered

and

successfully

"truly monstrous").
97. See FORTNEY & JOHNSON, supra note 89, at 11 (noting that malpractice decisions went up
four hundred percent during the 1970s as compared to the 1960s, and three hundred percent in the
1980s as compared to the 1970s); David J. Beck, Legal Malpractice in Texas, 43 BAYLOR L. REV.
(SPECIAL ISSUE) 1, 43 & n.1 (1991) (reporting that between 1976 and 1991, legal malpractice
decisions in Texas nearly doubled).
98. See, e.g., Ames & Gough, supra note 39.
99. See id. (identifying the most recent increase in claims volume as a result of the recession,
not actual malpractice).
100. See, e.g., Abby Simons, Rising Number of Minnesota Lawyers Punishedfor Misconduct,
STAR TRIB. (May 13, 2013), http://www.startribune.com/rising-number-of-minnesota-lawyerspunished-for-misconduct/20707085 1.
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implemented where the public recognizes that significant harm is
occurring and that it is going uncompensated.0' As a general matter,
societal norms over the past fifty years have shifted to be less and less
comfortable with the idea of uncompensated harm.102 This is particularly
true in the context of physical harms. However, the expansion of
tort to be more inclusive of recognizing and compensating non-physical
harms also supports the assertion that public conceptions of harm
have broadened. 10 3
Although more than thirty years have passed since scholars
identified that empirical studies were needed to determine "whether
nonmedical professional services cause losses which ought to be
compensated but which do not find redress within the current system,""
no such comprehensive studies exist today. Such studies are needed to
substantiate the intuitions that those harmed by attorney malpractice are
being underrepresented through litigation. One consideration in
determining the need for client protection is insurance coverage. What
are current insurance rates amongst those who are injured? Are payouts
through insurance even a real possibility? At the turn of the century,
very few employees had medical insurance, life insurance, or disability
insurance.'o This lack of redress confirmed a need to implement
workers' compensation. With respect to legal malpractice, however, it is
unclear how many clients are currently covered against the possibility of
attorney malpractice and the attendant economic damages.
Other factors may also lead to under-compensation of harmed
clients. Not unlike medical malpractice claims, provider-fault in legal
malpractice claims can be very difficult to measure. Some have argued
that in these situations "a lay jury is apt to be influenced more by its
subjective and emotional reaction to the injured [party]'s plight than by
the appropriateness of the defendant's conduct. Thus, lengthy and costly
litigation

can yield unpredictable results . . . ."'0

Because of the

difficulty of ascertaining fault, legal malpractice is a good candidate for
101. For example, auto accident no-fault was most seriously and widely considered at a time
when contemporary Department of Transportation studies estimated fifty-two percent of those
seriously injured in car crashes received no recovery under the tort liability system. Engstrom, supra
note 17, at 364-65.
102. Abraham, supra note 14, at 58 (noting that "society has come to find uncompensated
injury less and less tolerable").
103. For example, the recognition of emotional distress as a free-standing injury is a product of
modem tort jurisprudence. See GOLDBERG ET AL., supranote 8, 683-85.
104. Abraham, supranote 14, at 68.
105. ABRAHAM, supra note 77, at 44-45 (documenting workers' limited life, accident, and
disability insurance around the turn of the century).
106. O'Connell, supra note 20, at 126 (discussing medical malpractice claims).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol44/iss2/14

24

Mortazavi: A No-Fault Remedy For Legal Malpractce?

2015]

A NO-FAULT REMEDY

495

potential no-fault recovery.
Finally, the lack of legal representation of small claims may skew
current perceptions of the frequency of malpractice. Conceptually, there
is likely a group of claimants with meritorious small claims that is
unable to find a lawyer that would be willing to represent it. 10 7 in such
cases, contingency fees would be unattractive. However, currently there
are no statistics clarifying to what extent this is a real and prescient
problem. This number of small claimants may be large. As such, this is a
key information gap that must be filled to build a comprehensive
understanding of the implications of attorney misconduct and client
harm. Depending on the size of this group and the scale of their
aggregate harms, a no-fault system may gamer increased traction as the
best solution to compensate such parties.
V.

CONCLUSION

A no-fault system is likely a workable alternative to legal
malpractice tort principles. However, is American society currently at
the point where the "policy window" is open to propose a no-fault
solution to rising rates of legal malpractice claims?'o Despite the fact
that legal malpractice liability is increasing-albeit at what precise rate
remains unclear-there is little public discourse surrounding the idea of
limiting such suits. Concerns over medical malpractice judgments have
long been a hot button trigger for tort reform leading to limitations on
punitive damages, pain and suffering compensation, restrictive statutes
of limitations, and strict overall damage caps.
No such public outrage exists in relation to the professional liability
of lawyers. Lawyers are typically viewed as responsible for overall
excesses of litigiousness.109 Whether it is a product of general
public disdain for lawyers or the view that lawyers provide optional and
unnecessary services, the likelihood of relief from legislative action
107. There is evidence indicating that parties with meritorious claims are generally reticent to
bring suit through civil actions regardless of the amount of the claim in question. See DEBORAH R.
HENSLER ET AL., RAND INST. FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, COMPENSATION FOR ACCIDENTAL INJURIES IN

THE UNITED STATES 110 (1991) (noting only about ten percent of those who suffer from accidents
file suit).
108.

JOHN W. KINGDON, AGENDAS, ALTERNATIVES, AND PUBLIC POLICIES 177 (1984) ("Once

the window opens, it does not stay open long. An idea's time comes, but it also passes.").
109. Historically, lawyers have been viewed as opponents of no-fault systems that would
remove disputes from formal legal adjudication. ABRAHAM, supra note 77, at 93, 96 (discussing the
lengths to which the plaintiffs' bar mobilized to defeat no-fault); Editorial, Who Faults No-Fault?,
NEW REPUBLIC, Jan. 20, 1973, at 9 ("No-fault ... would have become law except for the fact that it
deprives a whole class of lawyers of their income.").
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limiting lawyer liability in these terms is unlikely. It would be
politically unsavory to propose legislation directly capping liability
against lawyers in tort actions or limiting client redress through
specialized statutes of limitations.
A no-fault proposal might be the best reform proposal left-not
because the public wants to limit lawyer liability or because lawyers
love sharing risk, but because it supports maximizing available coverage
for harmed claimants. With the benefits of expediency and efficiency, a
no-fault system is more likely to avoid the fox-guarding-the-henhouse
notion of self-regulation. While no-fault limits lawyer liability in a
specific case, it also protects a broader scope of clients predictably and
with minimal additional lawyer involvement.1 o As such, once more
facts and statistics are known regarding the frequency and impact of
client harms, the no-fault system for legal malpractice claims may amass
political support, protect more clients, and provide greater predictability
to the legal profession.

110. It is longstanding wisdom that tort verdicts are unpredictable, and some would argue that
they provide little more than an entry into a "lottery" for potential claimants. Franklin, supra note 8,
at 790 (calling tort verdicts the "defendants' lottery"); O'Connell, supra note 20, at 127 ("[T]he
legal system's effort to devise a fair and rational method for compensating injured persons and
disciplining poor professional practice has produced only a litigation lottery.").
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